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Chapter 1 
SOME PRELIMINARIES 
Introduction 
Voting studies in many countrie s have shown that middle class 
individuals typically vote for partie s favourable to busine ss 
intere sts, while members of the working class tend to vote for 
parties more nearly repre sentative of t he intere s t s of labour. 1 
It seems that a man's class po sition has a s ignificant effect on 
his political preference. 
In the light of this situation it i s intere sting to consider 
t he case of individuals who , while of working class parentage, are 
themselve s in important re spect s members of t he middle class . I 
shall refer to such individuals as the upwardly mobile. We might 
speculate that t he voting behaviour of t hese people will reflect 
the influence s of both their class of origin and class of 
de stination. 
The purpo se of this study i s to examine just what t he 
political consequence s of upward mo bility are, and to consider in 
detail one theory which has been put forward to account for these 
consequences. 
I have spoken of the upwardly mobile as members of t he middle 
class "in important re s pect s ". In subsequent chapters I shall 
take thi s to mean that they are members of t he middle class as far 
as their occupation i s concerned. Specifically, I shall treat 
upward mobility as movement from manual to nonmanual occupations . 
Such a convention needs jus tification and the re s t of thi s 
chapter is devoted to that end. What i s needed i s an analysis of 
the relationship of class to the manual-nonmanual dichotomy . I 
must begin therefore with a di scussion of the concept of class , 
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which so far has not been defined. 
The Definition of Class 
For many purposes, the mo s t appropriate terminology is that 
originally suggested by Weber [1946: 180-195J, and more 
recently advocated by Runciman [1968: 25-61J. Weber saw 
society as s tratified along three dimens ions , those of class , 
status and power, class being for him the purely economic 
dimension. This framework has the advantage of analytic 
precision, but it also has the following limitation. A class 
in the Weberian sense may s imply be a s tati stical aggregate of 
individuals with no conception of themselve s a s members of t hat 
clas s and no interest s in common other t han the purely economic. 
In other word s , in Weber' s s cheme of things classe s are analytiC 
constructs and not empirical phenomena. 
But such a u sage i s inappropriate in the present context. 
In talking of t he relationship between party and class we do not 
wish to restrict attention to the correlation between party and 
narrow economic intere s t, a s would be nece ssary if We 
accepted the Weberian definition of class . We know t hat t he 
worker, for example, i s influenced in hi s voting behaviour not 
only by his economic intere sts but also by the working class 
subculture, that i s , by the norms and value s of the social group 
to which he belongs [Parkin, 1967J. Therefore, to encompass 
the total relationship between party and class a suitable 
definition of class must isolate actual social groupings . 
A second approach is to treat clas s in terms of men' s 
subjective clas s identifications . (For example, Butler and 
Stokes make thi s choice in their s tudy of the relationship of 
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class to party in &i tain [1969: 66 J. ) Li.ke the We berian 
approaoh this proc.:edure has the advantage of definitional 
precision; a man.'s --lRRS is what he says it is. But again 
there are disadvantages . As Reissman pOints out, the fact that 
a man identifies With a certain class does not necessarily mean 
that he is conscious of that class as a social group to which 
he belongs [1960: 39J . He may be quite unrealistic in his 
class i.dentification. In any case, for some groups class may 
have little significance and the class identification of such 
people can have little meaning . In short, classes defined in 
terms of self-identification may be artificial groupings . 
The problem with both the Weberian and 'subjective class' 
approaches is that they achieve definitional precision by 
s.acrificing any conception of classes as empirical phenomena. 
In contras~ I should like to make use of an empirical approach 
which bypasses the need for an abstract definition of class. 
Our aim, it Will be recalled,is to analyse the relationship 
of the manual- nonmanual dichotomy to the class structure. If 
we can demonstrate empirically that our occupational dichotomy 
coi.ncides With a number of other sociological dichotomies then 
we shall have identified a division of society into two natural 
groupings; natural in the sense that members of one group have 
in common With each other a number of characteristics which they 
do not share with members of the other group. Further, since 
nonmanual occupations are generally better paid and more highly 
regarded than manual jobs, these groupings Will bear a 
hierarchical relationship to each other, exercising unequal 
control over the resources of society. Thus we shall be able 
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to regard our occupational dichotomy as an index of a division of 
society into two basic social strata . Finally, if, in accordance 
with the class identifications of many of the members of these two 
groups, we label the upper stratum the middle class and the lower 
stratum, the working cla ss , the manual-nonmanual criterion becomes 
an index of class differences. 
The pro cedure I am advocating bypasses the need to define 
class in general and defines instead two particular classe s . 
However, it must be noted that even these two groupings are 
imperfectly specified. Although there is no difficulty in 
placing the 'typical' individual in one of the two classes, there 
are many other marginal individuals who, in terms of some charact-
eristics are middle class and, in terms of others, are working 
class. Such imprecision i s often unavoidable when dealing with 
empirical phenomena, but it i s not necessarily a bad thing , for 
at least it avoids what Kaplan calls the "premature closure of 
our ideas " [1964: 70] . Le t me quote Kaplan a little further on 
this pOint: 
The demand for exactness of meaning and for precise 
defini tion of terms can easil y have a pernicious 
effect, a s I believe it often has had in behavioural 
science ••• There i s a certain kind of behavioural 
scientist who, at the least threat of an exposed 
ambiguity , scurrie s for cover like a hermit crab into 
the nearest abandoned logical shell. But there is 
no ground for panic. That a cognitive situation is 
not as well structured a s we would like does not imply 
that no inquiry made in that situation is really 
s cientific. On the contrary , ••• the scientist i s in 
no hurry for closure. Tolerance of ambiguity is as 
important for creativity in science as it is anywhere 
else [1964: 70- 71]. 
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Occupation as an Index of Class 
I must now demonstrate that the manual-nonmanual dichotomy 
is in fact an index of a division of society into middle and 
working classes. But before I do, two exceptions must be 
noted. First , in the case of women, the manual-nonmanual 
criterion is a misleading index of class position. This is 
because manual jobs for women are very limited and consequently 
many women who, by all other criteria are members of the working 
class, nevertheless find employment in lowly, but nonmanual 
positions . For this reason they will be excluded from this 
and subsequent discussion. 
Again, in the case of farmers , the manual-nonmanual 
dichotomy is a dubious index of class divisions, and in any case 
in most countries farmers exhibit patterns of political 
allegiance which are somewhat unrelated to the urban-indust+iEl 
class structure . Therefore farmers (and farmers' sons) will 
also be excluded from this study. 
Having noted these exclusions we may now discuss the 
relationship of the manual-nonmanual dichotomy to a number of 
other sociological variables. The first variable I shall 
consider is subjective sooial class . 
Surveys have shown that belief in the existence of classes 
is widespread and that the great majority of people identify with 
either the middle or the working class [Broom et al., 1968: 218; 
Butler and Stokes, 1969: 66; Centers, 1949: 77]. Let us look 
at precisely how this subjective class dichotomy relates to the 
manual-nonmanual distinction. If we group occupations into six 
or seven categories according to their relative prestige, then 
6 
we find, not surprisingly , t hat as we move up the occupational 
s cale the proportion of each occupational group which 
identifies with the middle class increases . Bu~ in t he 
Aus tralian and American cases , t her e are t wo very much more 
important aspect s of this relationship. First, every 
occupational grouping above the manual-nonmanual line consi s t s 
predominantly of middle class identifiers while every group 
below t he line consi s t s predomi nantly of working class 
identifiers . Secondly , the proportion of middle class 
identifiers does not rise s t eadily as we move up the 
occupational scale, but rather a very much sharper ri se occurs 
as we move acros s t he manual- nonmanual line t han at any other 
pOint on the scale [ Broom et al . , 1968: 225 ; Centers, 1949 : 
86J ~ In short, i n both the se countries a man' s subjective 
class identification i s more clo sely related to the manual-
nonmanual dichotomy t han to any other occupational dicho t omy. 
However, it i s not po ssible to assert thi s conclusion 
generally , s i.nce the r ecent British survey by Butler and 
Stoke s produced slightly different result s . They found t hat, 
unlike t he Aus tralian and Amer i can cases , i n Britain the lowes t 
nonmanual group consi s t s predominantly of working class 
identifiers ~ They found furt her that the pr oportion of 
middle class identifiers in Britain jumps sharply at t wo 
points on the occupational scale: firs t at the manual-non-
manual line, but secondly, even more dramati cally , at the 
dividing line between the lowes t nonmanual group and t he group 
immediately above it [1969 : 70J . Their i n terpretation of the se 
findings was that in seeking to relate occupation to 
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dichotomous subjective class, the manual-nonmanual distinction 
must be discarded and instead the occupational scale must be 
dichotomized so as to include the lowest nonmanual group with 
the manual workers. 
Despite this result it is clear that even in Britain the 
manual-nonmanual distinction is a reliable predictor of sub-
jective class and that given the Australian and American data 
we are justified in accepting this division of the occupational 
scale as the most natural one in the context of class 
identificationD 
Further support for the significance of the manual-non-
manual distinction comes from its relation to political 
preference. Many studies have shown that manual workers are 
more inclined than nonmanual workers to vote for radical 
parties. But, ironically , for evidence of the precise 
correspondence of our occupational dichotomy with the radical-
conservative dichotomy we must return to the survey conducted 
by Butler and Stokes. They found that , similarly to their 
findings on class identification, the proportion of each 
occupational group voting for the Conservative s increases as 
we move up the occupational scale, but that, in contrast with 
those findings, the sharpest increase occurs at the manual-
nonmanual line. Furthermore, again in contrast with their 
findings on class identification, all groups above the manual-
nonmanual line vote predominantly for the Conservatives while 
all those below vote predominantly for the Labour Party [1969: 
77J . Thus the British findings on political preference 
fUrther justify the particular occupational dichotomy chosen. 
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There i.s another item of information supporting this choice 
in the Australian context. Anderson and Western have shown 
that, using a six-point occupational scale, the children of 
men in each group above the manua1-nonmanua1 line are over-
represented in certain professional faculties of Australian 
universities while the chi.1dren of men in all groups below the 
line are under-represented [1970J. 2 
A more general reason for our choice is that the work 
situations of the two occupational groups differ significantly. 
Nonmanua1 workers are typically i nvolved in an occupational 
structure which offers them regular promotion and a lifelong 
career, while manual workers, early in their working lives, 
reach a level beyon which they cannot progress [Runciman, 
1969: 58]. Furthermore this difference in work situation is 
associated with ideological difference s . Nonmanua1 workers, 
seeing before them an occupational ladder , stress the value 
of i.ndividua1 effort , while manual workers, cons cious that 
opportunities for individual achievement are not available to 
them, emphasise collective action as the only way of bettering 
their lot [Runciman, 1969: 61J. 
Finally, we may ci te the important differences between t he 
life st yles of manual and nonmanua1 workers. For example, the 
nonmanua1 worker is more inclined to invite people to his home, 
go visiting with his wife, join clubs and to value education 
than his manual counterpart [Goldthorpe et a1., 1969, Chaps. 
4 and 5; Runciman, 1969: 57-62; Willmott and Young, 1960]. 
In t he light of the many differences I have mentioned it 
seems reasonable to concl ude that the manual-nonmanua1 
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distinction is i .n fact an index of a division of society into two 
basic social strata - the middle and the working classes. 
Oonsequently we can with some justification regard movement 
across this line a s a suitable index of mobility . 
(Of course it must be conceded that as well as this 
theoretical justification there is a practical consideration. 
Most other students of mobility have chosen to work with the 
manual-nonmanual dichotomy and therefore, in the interests of 
comparability , I must do likewise . ) 
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Chapter 2 
FINDINGS ON HOW THE UPWARDLY MOBILE VOTE 
The purpose of this chapter is to bring together prior 
findings on how the upwardly mobile vote and, at 
chapter's end, to introduce some new Aus tralian results. 
However the bulk of the chapter will be concerned with 
interpreting the somewhat ambiguous American data. 
Surveys in many European countrie s and in the United 
State s all show t hat the upwardly mobile are more 
conservative than f ellow countrymen in manual occupations . 
It seems that upward mobility i s universally accompanied 
by an increase in political conservatism [Butler and 
Stokes , 1969: 98 ; Lipset and Zetterberg, 1964: 457; 
Lipset and Zetterberg, 1959: 67; Lopreato, 1967: 587J. 
At the same time the data indicate t hat in Europe 
the upwardly mobile r emain, s tatis tically speaking, 
significantly3 more radical than those born into t he 
middle class , adopting a political s tance somewhere 
between their classes of origin and destination. The 
European re sults are summarized in Table 1 . (The 
British data, presented by Butler and Stokes , are not 
included in the table since they are not strictly 
comparable~ 
pattern.) 
Nevertheless they conform to t he same 
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TABLE 1 
Percentages of Urban European 
Men Voting Left, by Mobility+ 
Mobility 
Country and Party 
Choice Manual Upwardly 
Immobile Mobile 
Italy (Socialist, Soc e 
Communist) 
Dem. , 
71(189) 63(65) 
Germany (SOC9 Dem.) 64(357) 32(200) 
Fi.nland (Commu.ni. s t , SOC~ 
IJem. )++ 81(1017) 23(157) 
Norwar ( Communi s t, Labour) * 49(61) 
Sweden (Soo~ Dem~ ) * 47(135) 
Nonmanual 
Immobile 
44(144) 
20(142) 
6(356) 
29(73) 
20(315) 
+ Sources are quoted in the text~ People not expressing a party 
choice are eliminated from this table. N's are given in 
brackets in this and subsequent tables~ 
* 
++ 
Incomplete data~ 
The two Lipset and Zetterberg sources differ in the number of 
upwardly mobile sampled in the Finnish survey ~ I have 
chosen the later p-b ished fig~e for use in this table. 
Unlike the ~~opean case, the politioal position of the 
upwardly mobi e in America is very similar to that of the 
middle-class immobile~ In fact , according to Lipset and 
Zetterberg, "the American data ••• i.ndicate that successfully 
upwardly mobile sons of workers are even more conservative in 
party choice than those middle class individuals who se fathers 
held occu.pations comparable to their own" [1964: 456J. Indeed 
Lopreato, who endoreses this claim, has developed a theory 
explaini.ng why upwardly mo bile Americans 'over-conform' to the 
political norms of the middle class~ His theory runs as 
follows: in America suooess is the supreme goal, to which all 
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can and must aspire; as a result, upward mobility gives the 
achiever enormous satisfaction, and a sense of relief at having 
'made it'; this is likely to give ri se to a 'cult of gratitude', 
an attitude of deep-seated appreciation towards the social 
order for making t he pre sent pleasures possible; "(s)uch 
gratitude i s then expressed through an 'overconformity' to the 
prescribed behaviour of the middle class, specifically , by 
voting for (the Republican party)" [1967: 592J. 
But such theorizing is, I believe, premature, for the data 
which, according to Lipset, Zetterberg and Lopreato, demon-
strate the political overconformity of upwardly mobile Americans, 
are equivocal at best. To prove this I must undertake a 
systematic review of the evidence and the follOwing sections 
are devoted to this task. 
The Michigan Surveys 
The principal evidence cited by the three authors was 
collected by the Michigan Survey Research Centre . 
presented in Table 2: 
TABLE 2 
Left Voting of Urban American Middle 
Class Men, by Mobility 
Percent voting 
Democratic in ••• 
1948 
1952 
Mobility 
Upwardly 
Mobile 
35(72) 
22(67) 
Nonmanual 
Immobile 
Source: Lipset and Zetterberg, 1964: 457. 
It i s 
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The trends in this table are certainly in the direction sought 
by Lopreato, Lipset and Zetterberg and were interpreted by them 
as evidence of political overconformity . But in fact the table 
provides us with no reason to reject the null hypothesis that in 
America the upwardly mobile are politically similar to the middle 
class immobile. If x2 i s calculated for the se figure s we get 
values of .24 for the 1948 election and 1 . 18 for the 1952 
election, indicating t hat in both cases the difference between 
the upwardly mobile and the middle class immobile is very far from 
being statistically significant. 
Maccoby ' s Study of Cambridge Youth 
A second piece of evidence, cited by Lipset and Zetterberg, 
is the study by B.E. Maccoby of the political attitude s of youth 
in Cambridge, Massachusetts in 1952 [1954: 23-39J . According to 
Lipset and Zetterberg, '~accoby found that upward mobile youth in 
Cambridge were more Republican than non~obiles in the class to 
which the upward mobile moved" [1964: 460J. The evidence 
actually pre sented by Maccoby is contained in Tables 3 and 4. 
TABLE 3 
Party Preference of Middle Class 
Cambridge Youth , by Mobility 
Percent who are 
(have) •• • 
Republican definitely 
Republican leanings 
Independent 
Democratic leanings 
Democratic definitel y 
Total 
(N) 
Mobility 
Upwardly Norunanual 
Mobile Immobile 
18 21 
5 
9 28 
12 8 
56 43 
100 100 
(82 ) (73) 
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TABLE 4 
Presidential Choice of Middle Class 
Cambridge Youth, by Mobility . 
Per cent 
Preferring 
Eisenhower 
Stevenson 
To t al 
(N) 
••• 
Mobili ty 
Upwardly 
Mobile 
48 
52 
100 
(82 ) 
Nonmanual 
Immobile 
37 
63 
100 
(72 ) 
Let us first examine Table 3 for evidence of the Lipset-
Zetterberg claim~ To facilitate the di scussion let u s collapse 
Table 3 to form Table 5. 
TABLE 5 
Party Preference of Middle Class Cambridge 
Youth, by Mobility (Collapsed version). 
Per cent 
Preferringo •• 
Republican 
I ndependent 
~mocratic 
Total 
(N) 
Mobility 
Upwardly Nonmanual 
Mobile Immobile 
23 21 
9 28 
68 51 
100 100 
(82 ) (72) 
The fir st line of Table 5 sugge st s that, in apparent 
conformity with the claim made by Lipset and Zetterberg for 
Maccoby ' s finding s , the upwardly mobile are more inclined than the 
nonmanual immobile to prefer the Republicans . However the value 
of x2 for the difference is a mere .16. In other word s , if t he 
Lipset-Zetterberg claim i s ba sed on these data, it i s based on 
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a difference which, statistically speaking, is totally insignifi-
cant~ 
If, on the other hand, their claim is made on the bas i s of 
Table 4 it is again ill-founded, since x2 for that difference 
is only 1.58. Whichever the case the Lipset-Zetterberg 
interpretation of Maccoby ' s finding s mus t be rejected~ 
It is worth observing that Table 5 can be interpreted in 
quite another way ~ Scrutinizing the third line of the table 
enables us to make the following claim: '~accoby found t hat 
upward mobile youth in Cambridge were more Democratic than non-
mobiles in the class to which the upward mobile moved" .4 
Furthermore this difference i s statis tically s ignificant, being 
2 
supported by a X of 4.99. 
Thus the overall conclusion from Maccoby ' s study i s t hat 
amongs t Cambridge youth the upwardly mobile are significantly 
more Democratic and not significantly more Republican than the 
nonmanual immobile. It seems that Lipset and Zetterberg have 
misinterpreted her re sult s . Here indeed is strong evidence 
agains t the assumed political overconformity of upwardly mobile 
Americans . 5 
The M.I.T . Study 
A third piece of evidence cited by the proponents of t he 
overconformity the sis i s a s tudy by the M.I. T. Centre for 
International Studies in 1955, involving 1,000 randomly 
se lected American bus iness executives . According to Lipset and 
Zetterberg, "these data show that only 5 per cent of the children 
of manual workers are Democrats as compared with 10 per cent 
Democratic among the executive sons of middle or upper-class 
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fathers" [1964: 460J. Unfortunately , since these data are 
apparently unpublis hed, it has not been pos sible to cM.ck the 
details~ However Lipset and Zetterberg admit elsewhere t hat 
"the differences are too small to be significant" [1959: 67J. 
West's Study of College Graduate s 
In a forthcoming book, Lopreato cites further evidence of 
the overconformity of upwardly mobile Americans in the work of 
Patricia West [1954: 465-480J. As part of her s tudy Wes t 
looked at American college graduate s who, at the time of her 
survey in 1947, had made progress in their chosen careers and 
were financially well~off (earning more than $7 ,500 a year). 
She s ingled out two groups of such men: those who had worked 
their way through college, earning more t han half t heir college 
expenses , and t hose who had earned none of their college 
expenses, having been support ed by t heir parent s . These she 
termed t he self-made and the privileged men re spectively . 
Clearly the former, s tarting from a rela t ively impoveri shed 
situatio~may be regarded a s upwardly mobile while the latter 
are, in some sense, the middle class immobile. Of course t here 
i s not an exact correspondence between West' s two groups and t he 
two occupationally defined groups I have been u sing, but then it 
must be remembered that occupation i s only an index of class 
difference s . In the present context, West's definitions provide 
an alternative index with which to approach the study of upward 
mobility. 
In her article We s t was concerned to see whether, for college 
graduates , the economic status they attain in later life i s a 
better indicator of their political attitude s than is t heir 
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economic origin. She therefore compared her two groups of men 
on the politically relevant que stion of whether or not t hey 
favoured laissez-faire government. Her re sults are presented 
in Table 6. 
TABLE 6 
Proportions of Self-made and Privileged 
Men Oppo sed to Government Planning 
Earned half Earned none 
Per cent to all of college 
favouring ••• college expense s 
expense'S-
Laissez-faire 73 71 
Other 27 29 
Total 100 100 
(N) (484) (338 ) 
It should be noted t hat t he difference suggested in Table 6 i s 
s tatisti cally insignificant ( x2 = . 37) . Therefore, given 
West's concern, we might have expected her to conclude from 
these data that self-made men were "just as opposed t o 
government planning as the originally privileged group". 
Instead she actually wrote that t hey were "if anything , ~ 
oppo sed to government planning than t he originally privileged 
group" (emphasi s in original ) [1954: 479J. Whet her or not t he 
former were really ~ oppo sed than the latter i s irrelevant 
to her concern and she can be forgiven the s tatistical licence 
she takes in making this a ssertion. 
However, Lopreato quote s thi s observation by West as 
evidence of the pOlitical overconformity of upwardly mobile 
Americans . In doing so he takes the statement from a context 
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in which the statistical inaccuracy is unimportant to a context 
in which it is critical. West's statement is simply unaccept-
able as evidence of political overconformity . 
Interestingly enough, there is in West's article some good 
evidence that upwardly mobile Americans are not a s conservative 
as the immobile middle clas s . She presents data on the party 
affiliations of self-made and privileged men, analysed by age . 
In the context of the overconformity thesis West's age analysi s 
is irrelevent and so we may amalgamate her age groupings . 
so yields the information pre sented in Table 7. 
TABLE 7 
Party Affiliations of Self-made and Privileged Men 
Earned half Earned none 
Per cent to all of college 
Preferring ••• college expenses 
expense s 
Democrats 18 22 
Independents 40 29 
Republicans 42 49 
Total 100 100 
(N) (469) (326) 
Table 7 enables us to conclude that t he privileged men are 
Significantly more Republican than the self-made men ( x2 = 
3.89).6 Thus, far from supporting Lopreato' s viewpoint, 
DOing 
West's data provide significant evidence t hat the upwardly mobile 
in America are less conservative than the middle class immobile. 7 
The Work of Richard Centers 
The las t piece of evidence which i s relevant to the question 
of political overconformity comes from the work of Richard 
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Centers [1949: l80J. On the basi s of a battery of que stions he 
divided respondents in a 1945-1947 survey into radical, inter-
mediate and conservative categories. By relating thi s to 
mobility he obtained the re sults presented in Table 8. 
TABLE 8 
Political Stance of American Middle 
Class Men, by Mo bili t y • 
Per cent who were ••• Mobility 
Radical 
Intermediate 
Conservative 
Total 
(N) 
Upwardly 
Mobile 
14 
23 
63 
100 
(103) 
No nmanual 
Immobile 
11 
22 
67 
100 
(209) 
Although thi s table reveals a trend to radicalism on the part of 
the upwardly mobile, it i s not statistically s ignificant (for 
conservatives , x2 = .46). Nevertheless , Centers ' re sults are 
inconsi s tent with the overconformity thesi s , a fact which 
Lopreato acknowledges in hi s forthcoming book. 
Political Overconformity : The Verdict 
In reviewing t he data cited by Lopreato and Lipset and 
Zetterberg not one piece of stati stically Significant evidence 
has been found to support t he proposition that in America the 
upwardly mobile are more conservative than the middle class 
o bOl 8 JJllIDO 1 e. On the other hand two items of statistically 
s ignificant evidence (We s t and Maccoby) have been found to support 
t he proposition that in America the upwardly mobile are more 
radical than the middle class immobile. Clearly therefore, on 
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present evidence, the political overconformity thesis must be 
rejected. But clearly also, in the light of all the evidence, 
we cannot confidently assert that the upwardly mobile are 
actually more radical than the middle class immobile. Until 
further studies are done it is safest to conclude that upwardly 
mobile Americans are politically indistingu.ishable from their 
immobile middle class compatriots. 
The Australian Case 
While not all the claims made about the politics of the 
upwardly mobile in America are true, there i s no doubt that the 
European and American experiences differ markedly ~ In the 
former case the upwardly mobile adopt a political stance 
somewhere between their clas ses of origin and destination, while 
in the latter they vote the same way as those born into the 
middle class. In the light of this diffe~ence it is inter-
esting to examine the Australian case, presented in Table 9. 
TABLE 9 
Mobility and the Vote in Aus tralia 
Per cent Voting 
for ••• 
A.L . P. 
Other 
Total 
(N) 
Mobility 
Manual Down-
Immobile wardly 
Mobile 
57 44 
25 39 
18 17 
100 100 
(474) (139) 
Upwardly 
Mobile 
37 
44 
19 
100 
(219 ) 
Nonmanual 
Immobile 
20 
61 
19 
100 
(270 ) 
Note: For A.L . P ~ voters all differences are significant except 
that between the upwardly and downwardly mobile. 
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These data were collected in a nationwide survey of the 
Australian electorate conducted in 1967 by t he Political Science 
Department of t he Research School of Social Science s at the 
Aus tralian National University (for an account of t he sampling 
procedure see Kahan and Aitkin, 1968). The data in Table 9 
are for male household heads . 
are excluded. 
Farmers and sons of farmers 
It s hould be noted t hat t he category "other" in t he table 
consi s t s mainly of people whose voting preference was not 
determined. The percentages in thi s group are rather larger 
than might be expected, because the data were gathered either 
by asking directly , if t he re spondent himself was the household 
head, or, if t he re spondent was the head' s wife, by a sking her 
about her spouse. In the fir s t case the following que stion 
was used: "If a Federal election were held tomorrow, which 
party would you vo te for? II In the second case t he re spondent 
was a sked firs t whether her husband preferred any political 
party, and then, if he did, which it was . Predictably , the 
second, indirect approachdid not elicit party preference a s 
readily a s the more normal direct approach. Hence the 
relatively large proportions in t he category "other". 
The actual division of household head s into manual and 
nonmanual workers is that used by Broom and Jones [1969(b):65l]. 
It is based on the A. N. U. occupation code [Broom et al., 1965J. 
Mainly for reasons of symmetry Table 9 contains data on 
both the upwardly and the downwardly mobile. 
The data indicate that in Aus tralia, while the upwardly 
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are more conservative than the manual immobile, they are at the 
same time considerably more radical than the immobile middle 
class. Thus the Australian experience conforms to t he 
European and not the American pattern. 
Upward Mobility and Political Apathy 
It should be observed t hat thi s study i s concerned with 
the increased political conservatism of the upwardly mobile. 
Nothing has been said about the po ssibility t hat t he upwardly 
mobile might be at the same time less likely than immobile 
groups to nominate a political preference. Lipset ha s , in 
fact, sugge sted a t heory of 'cross pre ssure s ' whi ch predict s 
greater political apathy on t he part of the upwardly mobile . 
The idea i s that thi s group will be subject to pulls from 
different political directions and will react to this conflict 
by~thdrawal from involvement [Lipset et al., 1954: 1133- 34J. 
Lipse t cite s some evidence of thi s phenomenon, bu t Lopreato' s 
Italian data, which I cited earlier but did not pre sent in 
full, and the Australian data presented here do not support 
the t hes i s . In any case t he two processes - increased 
political apathy and increased poli tical conservati sm - may 
be studied quite independently , and it i s t he latter process 
which i s the concern of this study. 
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Chapter 3 
A THEORY OF CLASS DISCRIMINATION 
As demonstrated in the las t chapter, the political 
behaviour of upwardly mobile Americans is somewhat different 
from that of their European counterpart s . Two American 
sociologis t s , Lipset and Zetterberg [1964: 64- 66J, have offered 
an explanation of this difference in terms of varying degree s 
of class di scrimination. In thi s chapter I shall di scuss 
their theory and its development by Lopreato [1967: 586-92J, 
and in the next, I shall attempt to extend it to the Australian 
ca se. 
The theor y i s a s follows. when a person moves up in the 
economic hierarchy hi s life s t yle, which is an important 
component of his social class, may lag behind. The greater 
the discrepancies between t he middle and working class life 
style s , the greater will be the difficulty experienced by an 
upwardly mobile person in adjus ting himself to the s t yle of hi s 
new class , and the more likely he i s to feel di scriminated 
against. Advancing thi s argument in t he context of t he trans -
Atlantic comparison Lipset write s : 
Given the much wider di screpancy in consumption 
style s between the European and American middle 
and working clas s , one would expect the upwardly 
mobile European of working class origin to have 
somewhat greater difficultie s in adjus ting to hi s 
higher s tatus , and to feel more di s criminated 
against than his American counterpart, much like 
the successfully upwardly mobile Negro or other 
minority ethnic member in America comparing 
himself with a native-born Prote stant white 
[1960: 254-255J. 
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Normally, the argument continues, the "pervasive influence 
of contact with superior s tatus on attitudes and behaviour" 
[Lipset, 1960: 258J leads the upwardly mobile to emulate the 
voting habits of t heir former social superiors . But when the 
newcomer to the middle class feel s di scriminated agains t, his 
tendency to emulate middle class voting behaviour i s weakened . 
Hence in Europe the upwardly mobile are le ss inclined to 
change their vote than are their American counterparts . 
Lipset and Zetterberg do not develop thi s t heory at 
length; nor do they offer any evidence for it. It was left 
to Lopreato to continue where they left off. But before 
lOOking at Lopreato' s contribution three fairly extensive 
comments on the theory should be made. 
1. Political Resocialization 
There are really two di s tinct feature s of t he finding s 
covered by thi s theory . The fir s t i s the fact that upward 
mobility i s universally accompanied by increased conservat i sm ; 
the second, the fact that thi s process i s more marked in 
America than in Europe. Of course the se fact s are inter-
dependent and so i t i s not surpri s ing that in seeking to 
explain the se cond, which they do in terms of class di scrimi-
nation, Lipset and Zetterberg unavoidably offer at t he same 
time an explanation of t he fir st, in terms of t he emulation 
of social superiors . But it must be borne in mind that t he 
Lipset-Zetterberg theory was put forward a s an explanation of 
trans- Atlantic difference s . It must therefore be judged on 
it s abili ty to account for the se difference s and not on the 
adequacy of the explanation it offers of the increas ed 
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conservatism of t he upwardly mobile. 
But having conceded this, we may observe that to explain 
the increased conservati sm of the upwardly mobile in terms of 
the "pervasive influence of contact with superior s tatus on 
attitudes and behaviour" i s not entirely satis factory . The 
phrase sugge sts that the upwardly mobile individual simply 
copies t hose around him with no thought for where his own 
intere s t s lie. However, it seems more realistic to sugge s t 
that the upwardly mobile person vote s in accordance with what 
he sees his interests to be , although , of course, in deciding 
what hi s intere st s are he may s imply adopt t he views of the 
longer e s tablished middle class individuals with whom he 
as sociate s . 
Therefore, s ince t he reasons for the upwardl y mobile's 
increased conservatism are de batable, and s ince the whole i ssue 
i s relatively unimportant in the explanation of int ernational 
differences , in subsequent di scussion I shall de scribe the 
proce ss , in more general terms , a s one of 'politica l re-
socializa tion' • ( Incidentally , Lopreato uses thi s phrase 
to describe the process to which the downwardly mobile are 
subject [1970: 450J. ) 
2. Class Di scrimination 
It should be noted tha t while the indented quo t ation 
above refers to 'feelings of di scrimination', I have t alked of 
actual di scrimination. Thi s needs jus tification. 
In the fir s t place, Lipset indicate s that felt and actual 
discrimination are closely linked in hi s mind when he u se s t he 
s ituation of the negro to illustrate his meaning . There is no 
26 
doubt that the negro feels di scriminated against because he is 
discriminated against. 
Moreover, class discrimination doe s not necessarily refer 
to a policy consciously adopted by one class against another; 
it can be of B more insidious nature. Middle class individuals 
may be quite unaware of their tendency to select friend s from 
amongst their own class . Furthermore, the subtle sanctions 
they apply against those who fail to conform to the middle 
class life style may be seen as directed not at the working 
class but simply at bad manners and bad taste . However, although 
this subtle form of class di scrimination may pass unrecognised by 
those who practice it, it i s still class di s crimination, and its 
effects are felt by tho se at whom it i s directed. Once thi s i s 
unders tood it is clear that feeling s of discrimination can be 
equated legitimately with the actual presence of class 
discrimination. 
3. Status Inconsistency 
The third comment i s really only a digression. It concerns 
a possible confusion of the Lipset- Zetterberg theory with 
Lenski's theory of status incons i stency [ 1954 : 405-413J . 
Lenski suggested that the inconsistency between an individual' s 
pOSitions on various status scales might contribute to hi s 
likelihood of voting left, quite independently of t he contribution 
made by his position on any one of tho se scale s . The idea was 
that an individual who expected to be treated in accordance with 
his high position on one scale (say high income), but who was in 
fact treated in accordance with hi s low po sition on another ( say 
low education), would feel frustrated, and would give vent to 
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this frustration by voting for a party which promised some 
change in the social. order and therefore, hopefully, of his 
situation. 
There is no doubt that the upwardly mobile individual is 
a status inconsistent in Lenski' s terms , for he is high on the 
economic scale and low in terms of class of origin. Further-
more, this is an inconsistency between an achieved status 
(economic situation) and an abscribed status (class of origin) 
- the t ype of in00nsistency which is most likely to affect 
political preference [Jackson, 1962: 476J. Thus it might 
appear that the effect hypothe sized by Lipset and Zetterberg 
is simpl y a special case of the effect hypothe sized by Lenski. 
But in reality t he two effect are qui te distinct . The basic 
assumption of the Lenski model is that, in the absence of 
inconsistency effects, the s tatus inconsistent' s political 
preference is determined by taking some kind of weighted 
average of hi s po sitions on the various status scale s . But 
the basic assumption of the Lipset-Zetterberg theory i s that 
in the absence of 'inconsistency effect s ' (feelings of dis-
crimination) the vote of t he upwardly mobile individual will 
be determined exclusively by his economic status. To put it 
another way : suppo se the probability that a mobile individual 
will vote left i s found to be a 'simple average of the middle 
and working class probabilitie s of voting left . Then, in 
Lenski's terms there is no inconsi stency effect, while in terms 
of the Lipset- Zetterberg hypothesis , class di scrimination is 
operative. Thus the effects hypothe sized by Lenski are not 
those hypothe sized by Lipset and Zetterberg . Consequently , 
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although on the surface t he two theories appear to be closely 
related they are in fact quite distinct. 
Lopreato's Contribution 
We can now turn to Lopreato's contributiono He has 
concentrated on two separate aspects of the Lipset-Zetterberg 
theory. First he points out that it fails to account for the 
hypothesized political overconformity of upwardly mobile 
Americans, and he attempmto remedy this deficiency by combining 
the Lipset-Zetterberg theory with the 'cult of gratitude' 
theory mentioned in the last chapter. However, since t he 
politioal overconformity of upwardly mobile Americans i s yet to 
be demonstrated, this a spect of Lopreato's work need not detain 
us~ 
The second a spect of his work i s his attempt to determine 
whether the mechanism of class di scrimination does in fact 
operate as hypothesized. He isolates two elements of the process 
postulated by Lipset and Zetterberg: 
I~ discrepancie s in consumption style s , and 
II. feelings of dis crimination, 
and he sets out to study these elements in Italy, a country where 
the political resocialization of the upwardly mobile i s far from 
completeb 
I. Consumption Patterns 
Lopreato's expectation in relation to consumption patterns 
is that when the upwardly mobile succeed in adjusting their 
consumption styles to that of the old-time middle class, they will 
also become politically similar. He thus formulate s two hypotheses: 
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1(1) Newcomers to the middle class have a lower consumption 
style than old-timers: 
1(2) As the newcomers attain the consumption style of the 
old-timers they become comparable to them in political 
orientation o 
Measuring consumption style by the number of consumer durable s 
owned he found support for the fi.rs t but not the second 
hypothesis. 
It is not surprising that hypothesis 1(2) was unsupported. 
Although po ssibly the case in America, in mo s t other countrie s 
style of consumption is not identical with scale of consumption. 
To try to measure consumption s t yle by the number of items owned 
is quite unacceptableo 
But this criticism should be carried a s tep fUrther. 
Lopreato singles out 'discrepancies in consumption s t yle' for 
discus sion, and although thi s phrase was u sed by Lipset, a bove, 
he was clearly referring to di screpancie s in 'living st yle' • 
(Indeed this latter phrase was used elsewhere by Lipset and 
Zetterberg [1959: 66])e The sort of di screpancies which are 
mo s t likely to give rise to feeling s of di scrimination are not 
simply matters of consumption, but cultu~al intangible s such as 
table manners, taste and speech. According to Melvin Tumin: 
(often), when status-mobile s , with full credentials 
in hand, knock upon the doors of elite membership 
groups, demanding acceptance and recognition, ••• 
(they are) denied the final bestowals of grace on 
grounds quite irrelevant to tho se which pre sumably 
determine one's right to such recognition. Even 
though sufficient income, education, occupational 
rank, commodiousness of re sidence, and auxiliary 
criteria have been met, the occupants of the top 
statuses invoke other criteria, such as kinship, 
ethnic origin, table and bar manners , and coldnes s 
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of emotional toning, in order to justify the denial 
to the status-mobiles of access to intimacy with 
them in their own highly-ranked associations 
[1957: 33] 0 
The class (as oppo sed t o racial) di scrimination recognised here 
is more a matter of life style than s t yle of consumption. 
In t he light of these various comments it seems reasonable 
to conclude on a priori grounds that no index of material 
consumption can be a useful indicator of whether the upwardly 
mobile have been accepted into the middle class . (In fairne ss 
to Lopreato it should be pointed out that he advance s the se 
criticisms himself in discussing hi s finding s . ) 
II~ Feelings of Di scrimination 
Lopreato's data on 'feelings of discrimination ' came from 
t he following question : "In your opinion, do those who belong 
to a given social class tend to re strict their relations with 
persons belongi.ng to other social classe s? " In order to ensure 
that answers to t his question were relevant to the theory he had 
to assume that "the perceptions produced by the que stion reflect 
personal experiences" [1967 : 590] . In other words , he had to 
a ssume that those who claimed tha t inter-class relations were 
re stricted did so because they had personal experience of the se 
restrictions . With thi s in mind, Lopreato was able to predict, 
on the basis of the theory , that: 
11(1) Newcomers to the middle class are more likely 
than the old-t imers to perceive re s trictions 
on inter-class relations . 
11(2) Among the newcomers, tho se who perceive obstructions 
to inter-class relations are politically more 
leftist than those who do not perceive such 
restrictions. 
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11(3) Finally, those who do not perceive impediments 
to inter-class relations are politically alike -
whether old-timers or upwardly mobile . 
Lopreato found support for all three hypotheses . But before 
we take this as evidence for the theory of class discrimination, 
a few comments on interpretation are necessary. 
First, the interpretation of li(l)'is somewhat ambiguous. 
We have assumed that respondents answer Lopreato's question on 
the basis of personal experience. But in the case of an old-
time membe~ of the middle class, precisely what experience he 
draws on is not clear. Possibly in answering the question he 
considers whether he has experienced discrimination at the 
hands of the working class. If thi s i s the case, 11(1) 
involves the i ssue of working class discrimination against the 
middle class and hence i s not relevant to a theory of middle 
class discrimination. 
However, old-time members of the middle class are unlikely 
to conceive of the po ssibility of working class di s crimination 
agains t themselve s . Let us therefore accept the more likely 
alternative tha t the old-timer answers Lopreato's que stion on 
the basi s of whether or not he perceives his own middle class 
closing ranks against working class intruders . 
Similarly, and Lopreato makes this point [1967: 590J, the 
upwardly mobile are more likely to answer the question on the 
basis of perceived di scrimination by their social superiors , 
the old-time middle class, than on t he basis of discrimination 
by the working class . 
The se points conceded, 11(1) involve s a compari son of 
newcomers with old-timers on the extent to which each i s aware 
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of discrimination by the middle class. This comparison is 
relevant to the theory, for.\ if middle class discrimination 
exists we would expect thos e who suffer it to be more 
sensitive to its existence than tho se who practice it. There-
fore, since Lopreato found support for 11(1) we can accept 
this as evidence for the existence of middle class discrimini-
nation. 
Lopreato's hypothesis 11(2) is quite straightforward, but 
his 11(3) might have been better formulated. The theory 
predicts that those amongst the upwardly mobile who experience 
no discrimination will be politically similar to the whole of 
the immobile middle class. However Lopreato compares the 
former group not with the l atter, but with only those amongst 
the immobile middle class who perceive no re strictions on 
inter-class relations. This is unnecessarily restrictive 
but it does not detract from the relevance of the re sult. 
In summary, these three hypotheses provide convincing 
evidence for the theory of class di scrimination, always 
assuming that respondents answer the question on the basis of 
personal experience. But it is thi s assumption I should like 
to call into question in what follows . 
An Alternative Interpretation of Lopreato's Evidence 
Lopreato's assumption about the way re spondents answered 
his que stion was essentially unsupported. Often, such 
assumptions pas s unnoticed, or are deemed 'reasonable', until 
an alternative assumption i s produced. In the present 
context an alternative i s at hand, and I should like to 
discuss it at some length in order to highlight the critical 
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nature of Lopreato's assumption . 
In order to introduce my alternative I must begin with 
a brief discussion of t he middle class and traditional working 
class social perspectives. Goldthorpe and associates have 
described these two perspective s a s follows : 
(The traditional working class ) conception of the 
social order is a dichotomous one: society is 
divided into 'us ' and 'them' . 'They' are persons 
in positions in which they can exerci se power and 
authority over 'us' . The divi sion between 'us ' 
and 'them' is seen as a virtually unbridgeable 
one; people are born on one side of the line or 
the pther and very l argely remain there • •• 
(On the other hand, the t ypical middle class) 
conception of the social order is a hierarchical 
one: society i s seen a s divided into a serie s of 
levels or strata differentiated in terms of life 
styles and associat ed pre stige of their members . 
The s tructvxe is, however, seen as a relatively 
'open' one: given ability and t he appropriate 
moral qualities - determination, perseverance, 
etc . - individuals can, and do, move up in the 
hierarchy [1969: 118- 120J. 
Goldthorpe acknowledges that these t wo perspectives are ideal 
types, but he argues , ci ting evidence, that, at least i n 
Britain, the two types have some empirical fov~dation. 
Cl early , if these ideal-t ypical perspectives prevail i n 
I taly, they will influence the answers to Lopreato's question. 
Members of the working cla ss will be predispo sed to believe that 
inter-class relations are re stricted while members of the middle 
class will be predispo sed to believe that they are not. 
The alternative to Lopreato's a s sumption can now be stated: 
it is that re spondents answer the que stion on the basis of the 
class perspectives de scribed by Goldthorpe and not on the basis 
of personal experience . 
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If this assumption is to be regarded as a serious 
alternative, then I must show that it yields a satisfactory 
explanation of the relationships which Lopreato found, since 
if those relationships 'make sense' only on the basis of 
Lopreato's a ssumption, then we will have reason to prefer 
that assumption to t he alternative. Let us therefore 
consider the implications of our alternative assumption. 
Since opinion on the closure of class relations i s , we 
are assuming, simply a class-determined belief, t he general 
process of class resocialization to which the upwardly mobile 
are subject wil l operate to change that opinion. Thus we 
may expect the upwardly mobile to become le ss inclined than 
the immobile working class but to remain more inclined than 
the immobile middle class, to assert that inter-class 
relations are re stricted. Observe t hat Lopreato' s 11(1) 
is consis tent with thi s expectation. 
Furthermore, political re socialization is another aspect 
of general re socialization process referred to above . 
Therefore, for any particular upwardly mobile per son, the more 
advanced t he general resocialization process , the more inclined 
he will be both to vote conservatively and to deny t hat classe s 
clo se ranks agains t outsiders . In other words, amongst the 
upwardly mobile we expect a correlation between left voting and 
asserting the exi s tence of re strictions on int er-class relations , 
a correlation which Lopreato demons trated in hi s 11(2). 
Finally, in view of thi s correlation, we expect th~t in . 
those cases where re socialization with respect to opinion on 
inter~class restrictions is complete, political resocialization 
will also be complete~ 
with thi s expectation. 
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Again , Lopreato' s 11 (3) i s consi s tent 
Thus, the assumption t hat re spondents answer on t he ba s i s 
of the clas s perspectives de scribed by Goldthorpe allows u s to 
'make sense' of Lopreat o' s finding s in a way which i s quite 
unrelated to the theory of clas s di scrimination. To put it 
another way , while Lopreato claims that his data support the 
theory of clas s discrimination, we might just a s validly 
claim that they do nothing of the sort, but rather demonstrate 
that the upwardly mobile are subject to a general proce ss of 
clas s re socialization. 
It should be emphas i sed here that the alternative inter-
pretation I have offered of Lopreat o' s data i s no t an alter-
native explanation of international difference s in the 
political behaviour of the upwardly mobile, because it doe s 
not isolate a variable capable of predicting t hose difference s . 
I t s sole purpo se i s to demonstrate, a s convincingly as possi ble, 
t hat Lopreato 's fai~ure to jus tify hi s assumption leaves his 
data ambiguousl y r elevant t o the t heory of class di scrimination . 
Interes tingly enough there i s one way in which Lopreato 
might have justified hi s assumption. It will be recalled that 
t he t heory of cl ass discrimination po s tulat e s t hat t he middle 
class di scriminate s agains t the working class and that t he 
upwardly mobile , whose pat hs are blo cked by this di scrimination, 
Will be peculiarly aware of it. In particular, we expect the 
upwardly mobile to be more aware of middle class di scrimination 
than are the immobile members of the working class , who have less 
contact With the middle class and therefore less chance of 
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experiencing social rejection. Thus Lopreato might have 
formulated the fo l lowing hypothesi s a s a companion to 11(1): 
Newcomers t o the middle class are more likely 
than the working class immobile to perceive 
rest~ictions on inter-class relations . 
The importance of this hypothesis i s t hat it i s inconsi s tent 
with our alternative assumption, on t he bas i s of which we 
predicted that newcomers to t he middle class would be less 
likely than the immobile working class to assert the clo sure 
of class relations ~ In short, if true, thi s hypothe si s 
would eliminate our alternative assumption, the~eby s trength-
ening confidence in the 'personal experience' assumption. 
It i s indeed unfortvnate that Lopreato did not tes t thi s 
hypothesi s . As it i s we mus t conclude that t he relevance of 
hi s evidence to the theory of class di scrimination depends 
on the acceptance of a possibly jus tifiable, but neverthele ss 
unjus tified, assumption . 
I have di s cussed Lopreato' s work at length because it 
provide s a technique with which to te s t the theory of class 
discrimination in t he Aus tralian setting. In applying t he 
technique I hope to take account of t he criticism I have 
But thi s i s the subject of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4 
THE AUSTRALIAN CASE 
The Lipset-Zetterberg theory, pre sented in the previous 
chapter, was advanced as an explanation of trans-Atlantic 
differences . In the present c~apter I shall see whether it 
accounts for the incomplete political resocialization of the 
upwardly mobile in Australia. In order to do this we can 
reformulate the theory as follows : 
(1) Upward mobility i s a cause of political 
re socialization. However , 
(2) when such mobility occurs , life style lags 
behind, giving ri se to di screpancie s between 
the life s t yle of the mobile individual and 
that of his new class ~ Furthermore, 
(3) life style dis crepancy i s a source of class 
discrimination, and 
(4) this di scrimination retards political 
re socialization. 
Corollary : Since there is a much wider difference between 
the life st yles of the European middle and working classes 
than there is between those of the American middle and 
working classes, the upwardly mobile are much less inclined 
to change their vote in Europe than t hey are in America. 
Formulating the theory in thi s way enable s it to be 
scrutinized and te sted quite independently of the specific 
trans-Atlantic compari son in which it originated. Clearly , 
to test the theory in the Aus tralian context, I mus t 
consider in turn the validity of each of the four 
propositions . 
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Proposition 1 
Table 9 showed that in Australia the upwardlY mobile 
are more conservative t han the immobile working class . 
Such findings in other countries have been taken to indicate 
that upward mobility causes political resocialization. 
HOwever, as Butler and Stokes point out, it i s also possible 
that "(c)onservative parti sanship i s one of a clus ter of 
ideas and values within t he childhood family that predispo se 
an individual to move upwards" [1969: 99J; that is, it i s 
possible that upward mobilit,y i s a consequence of a prior 
conservative outlooko If Proposition 1 i s to be properly 
te sted we must show that upward mobility doe s in fact cause 
political resocialization. 
It is conceivable that both the above processe s are at 
work, and it is as well to look at each separately. Let u s 
first establi sh whether upward mobility i s in part a cause 
of political conservatism. It might appear that thi s can be 
done by demonstrating t hat the upwardly mobile are more 
conservative than their fathers . However, such a procedure 
i s not satisfactory, f or the following reason. If t he 
re spondents ' generation i s , as a whole, more conservative 
than the previous generation, then any group of respondents , 
and in particular the upwardly mobile, might be expected to 
be more conservative than their fath ers . FortunatelY, we 
can avoid this difficulty and still demonstrat e the 
political effects of upward mobility by formulating and 
testing t he following hypothe sis: 
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H(l) Amongst respondent s who se fathers voted Labor 
when their sons were growing up, the upwardly 
mobile will be more conservative than the 
manual immobile. 
Table 10 confirms this hypothesis. 
TARLE 10 
Political Preference of the Upwardly Mo bile and t he 
Nonmanual Immobile whose Fathers voted Labor when 
their Sons were Growing up.* 
Per cent voting 
for A.L. P. 
Manual 
Immobile 
UpwardIy 
Mobile 
who se Fathers whose Fathers 
voted Labor voted Labor 
82 
(192) 
61 
(81) 
*Only respondent s whose political preference i s 
known to be for the A.L. P. or t he L. C. P. are 
included in thi s table. 
Note: the difference i s s ignificant ( x2 = 13.9). 
To te s t whether mobility is in part a consequence of a 
prior conservative outlook we might hY pothesize that: 
H(2) The fathers of t he upwardly mobile are more 
likely than the fathers of the manual immobile 
to have voted conservatively when t heir sons 
were growing up. 
This hypothesis is tested and disconfirrned by Table 11. 
TABLE 11 
Father's Vote when Son was Growing up, 
by Son' s Mobi1i tY* 
Percent of Fathers 
who voted A.L. P. 
Manual 
Immobile 
81 
(258 ) 
Upwardly 
Mobile 
80 
(123) 
*Only fathers whose political preference was known to 
be for the A.L.P. or the L. C. P . are included in thi s 
table. 
Note: the difference is n~t significant, even u sing a 
one-tailed te s t (x = .09)~ 
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Thus we may conclude that in Australia upward mobility 
is a cause and not a consequence of conservatism. 
is therefore establi shed . 
Proposition 
Proposition 2 
The second propo sition assert s t hat when upward mobility 
occurs life style lags behind, giving rise to dis crepancie s 
between the life s tyle of the mobile individual and that of his 
new class. I have no data with which to te s t thi s propo sition, 
and in any case, a s pointed out in t he di scussion of Lopreato's 
first set of hypotheses, life style differences are very 
difficult to measvxe. However, I t hi.nk we may regard the 
proposition as a truism, since it i s clearlY difficult if not 
impossible for the upwardly mobile to eliminate all traces of 
their class of origin and to become entirely assimilated into 
the middle class. 
Proposition 3 
The third propo sition asserts that life style discrepancies 
are a sovxce of class discrimination. Now we may note that a 
man who i s indistingv.ishable from members of the immobile middle 
class in all re spects save that his father was a manual worker 
would be discriminated against only in a socie ty which placed 
great importance on as cribed status . Australia is probably 
not such a society. Hence we may argue that if a mobile 
individual in this country succeeded in adjusting his life style 
to the point where it became indistinguishable from that of the 
old-timers in t he middle class , he would not be subject to 
class discrimination. In other words, in Aus tralia i t is the 
di screpancy between the life styles of the upwardly mobile 
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and their new class which makes dis crimination against them 
possible. Therefore, to demonstrate the proposition all we 
need do is establish that the upwardly mobile are actually 
subject to class discrimination. 
The only." information I have on the question of class 
discrimination comes from the nation-wide survey cited 
earlier, in which the following question was asked: "How 
difficult would you say it is for people to move from one 
class to another?" UnfortunatelY the que stion does not 
ask directly about experience of class dis crimination and 
so we are faced at the outset with the ambiguity inherent 
in Lopreato' s que stion: po ssiblY re spondents answer on the 
basis of personal experience, but po ssiblY t heY answer on 
some other basis. The most important alternative (if I am 
to avoid the criticisms I levelled at Lopreato) is that they 
answer on the basis of the middle class and traditional 
working class perspectives de scribed earlier. Let us see 
if we can eliminate t hi s po ssibility. 
Clearly, on the basis of those types , we can make the 
follOwing prediction: 
H(3) The immobile working class will be more 
likely than the immobile middle class to 
a s sert the difficulty of changing class . 
This prediction i s te s ted in Table 12. 
However none of the differences between the two immobile 
groups in Table 12 is significant, even using a one-tailed 
testing procedure. In other words , the hy'pothesis is not 
confirmed, and we may conclude that re spondents are not 
answering on the basis of the class perspectives described by 
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Gold thorpe. 
TABLE 12 
Claimed Di~ficulty of Mobility, by Mobility 
Per cent claiming 
mobility is ••• 
Very Difficult 
Fairly Dif~icult 
Not very Difficult 
N. A. 
Total 
(N) 
Manual 
Immobile 
24 
27 
36 
13 
100 
(268 ) 
Mobility 
Upwardly 
Mobil€ 
21 
26 
41 
12 
100 
(125) 
Monmanual 
Immobil€ 
18 
30 
43 
9 
100 
(162) 
Thi s conclusion lends support to t he 'personal experience' 
as sumption but it doe s not constitute direct evidence ~or it, 
because it is possible that re spondent s answer on the basis of 
other class perspectives . One that comes to mind i s the 
perspective of the privatized worker, a furt her type identi~ied 
by Goldthorpe. The privatized worker i s not involved in the 
solidary communal relat ionship s o~ t he traditional working class , 
hi s social intereaction being principallY with his family 
[1969: 50]. Unlike the traditional worker, he conceive s o~ 
society in terms o~ a 'money' model, consi s ting of several 
classes differentiated primarily by wealth [1969: 149]. 
Goldthorpe sees the privatized worker a s the type towards which 
the traditional British worker i s evolving [1969: l63-l65J, and 
we might well speculate that the class perspective of the 
Aus tralian worker i s rather more privatized than traditional. 
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However, the privatized worker believes that it is rarely 
possible to move up from one class to another [1969: 151]. 
Thus, even if working class respondents answer the mobility 
question on the basis of a privatized rather than a tradit-
ional working class perspective we should still make 
prediction H(3). Therefore, since H(3) was disconfirmed, 
this second alternative must be dis carded along with the 
first. Again, this does not prove that respondents 
answer on the bas i s of personal experience, but the fact that 
two possible alternative s have had to be dis carded certainly 
supports the proposition. Consequently, I propo se to 
accept it. 
The argument of the last paragraphs may seem rather 
indirect, and it .will be recalled that at the end of the last 
chapter a technique was sugge sted for demons trating more 
directly that re spondents answer on t he basis of personal 
experience. Unfortunately the technique cannot be applied 
here and it i s as well to see why, before we return to the 
task of thi s section, namely, the te sting of Proposition 3. 
The technique I refer to involved comparing the answers 
of the immobile working class and the upwardly mobile. The 
idea was that the upwardly mobile had more contact with the 
immobile middle class than did immobile members of the working 
class . They were therefore more likelY to encounter class 
discrimination than were the working class immobile. Thus, 
the assumption that answers were based on personal experience 
gave rise to the prediction that the upwardly mobile would be 
more likelY than the working class immobile to assert the 
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closure of class relations. 
But, in the present context, a s soon as we assume that 
re spondents answer on the bas i s of personal experience a 
further ambiguity arises which prevents comparisons between 
groups with different mobility experiences and hence prevents 
a test of the assumption. The problem i s that a re spondent 
who claims, on the basis of experience, that it i s difficult 
to change class doe s not necessarily mean that he has 
experienced class di scrimination. This i s so because t here 
are two rather different a spects of class ; t he di stributive 
aspect and the relational a spect. (This di stinction is made 
by Beteille [1969 : 13J.) The di stributive aspect refers to 
the fact that class differences corre spond to difference s in 
the distribution of wealth , occupational status , prestige 
and power. The relational a spect refers to t he way in 
which members of different classes relate to each other. It 
i s only if the re spondent has in mind the relat ional a spect 
of class when answering the mo bility que stion that his answers 
will be relevant to the i ssue of class dis crimination. There-
fore, before comparing groups of re spondents we must be 
confident that t hey are answering the que stion on this basi s . 
Let us look at how particular re spondents might answer t he 
que stion. 
The upwardly mobile individual, who has successfully 
changed class a s far as the dis tributive aspect s are concerned, 
i s probably reflecting experience of class dis crimination when 
he assert s the difficulty of changing class . On the other 
hand , the immobile manual worker is less in contact with his 
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social superiors than i s the upwardly mobile individual and is 
consequently probably less aware of any clas s discrimination. 
When he a s serts the difficulty of changing class he is more 
likely to be as serting the difficulty of rai s ing his income 
and occupation to middle class levels ; that i s , he is 
probably making a s tatement about the di s tributive rather 
than the relational aspect s of class . As far a s members of the 
immobile middle clas s ~reconcerned, t here seems to be no way 
of deciding which aspect of class they are likely to be more 
sensitive to when answering the mobility que stion. 
In summary, though we a s sume t hat re s pondent s all answer 
on the bas i s of personal experience, t hey are likely to be 
drawing on different kinds of experience, making compari sons 
of the re sponse s of the above three groups meaningless: it 
is only the upwardly mobile themselve s who are likely to 
answer on the bas i s of whether or not they have experienced 
class discrimination. Thu s , the compari son between the 
immobile working class and the upwardly mobile cannot be u sed 
to te s t the a s sumption that re spondent s answer on t he bas i s of 
personal experience. Nevertheless , I have already cho sen to 
accept thi s a ssumption and, in t he absence of further evidence, 
I shall s tand by that choice. 
With these various pOints in mind we can now return to 
Propo sition 3. It will be recalled that we aim to e s tabli sh 
that the upwardly mobile are subject to class di scrimination. 
Lopreato e s tablished thi s by comparing the upwardly mobile 
with the middle class immobile, but as I have jus t argued, 
such a comparison i s not po ssible in the pre sent context. 
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However, given that they are influenced primarily by the 
relational aspect of class , any claim by the upwardly 
mobile that it i s difficult to change class is likely to 
reflect experience of class discrimination. Thus Table 12 
indicate s that indeed a considerable proportion of the 
upwardly mobile have experienced class dis crimination and so 
provide support for Propo sition 3. 
Proposition 4. 
We consider next the fourth propo sition which assert s 
that class di s crimination retards political re socialization. 
Thi s i s really t he crux of the t heory. The propo sition 
give s ri se to the following qypothesi s : 
H(4) Amongs t the upwardly mobile, t hose who come 
in contact with class discrimination will be 
more inclined than tho se who don't to vote 
Labor. 
Now among s t the upwardly mobile, variations in answers 
to the mobility que s tion will reflect variat ions in experience 
of class di s crimination. Hence t he dat a of Ta ble 13 are 
relevant to our hypothe s i s . 
TABLE 13 
Political Preference of the Upwardly Mobile, 
by Claimed Difficulty of Mobility* 
Per cent 
voting A.L. P. 
Claimed Difficulty of Mobility 
Very 
Difficult 
55 
(22) 
, { 
Fairly 
Difficult 
58 
(26) 
Not very 
Difficult 
44 
(45) 
*Only tho se whose political preference i s known to be for 
t he A.L.P. or t he L.C.P. are included in thi s table. 
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However none of the difference s in Table 1 3 i s 
significant and t herefore H(4) is not confirmed. Of course 
t he trend i s as predicted and it i s possible that with 
larger numbers the hypothe si sed difference would have been 
confirmed. But with the pre sent data the null hypothe sis 
cannot be rejected. In other word s pre sent evidence doe s 
not support the propo sition that clas s dis crimination retards 
the political re socialization of the upwardly mobile. 
But more conclusive evidence agains t t he t heory i s at 
hand. If the mechani sm of class dis crimination i s to serve 
as t he explanation of why t he political re socialization of t he 
upwardly mObile remains incomplete, t hen we mus t show t hat, 
in the absence of class discrimination, poli t ical re sociali-
zation i s complete. We t herefore expect that: 
H(5) The upwardlY mobile who experience no clas s 
di scriminat ion will be poli t ically s i milar 
to the immobile middle class . 
But Table 14 reveals tha t t his i s not t he case. 
TABLE 14 
Compari son of t he Votes of t he Nonmanual Immobile 
and t he UpwardlY Mobile who claim t hat Mobility 
i s no t ver y Difficult. * 
Per cent voting 
for A. L. P. 
Upwardly Mobile 
claiming that 
Mobility i s not 
very Difficult 
44 
(45 ) 
Nonmanual 
Immobile 
25 
(219 ) 
*Only tho se who se political preference is known to be for 
the A.L. P. or the L.C.P. are included in thi s table. 
Note: t he difference i s significant. (x 2 = 6.86 ). 
48 
Thus the theory of class discrimination does not explain the 
voting behaviour of the upwardly mobile in Australia. Or, to 
put it another way, some factor other t han class di scrimination 
i s re sponsible for retarding t he upwardly mobile's change of 
vote in Australia. 
Recapitulation 
In this chapter I have demonstrated t hat upward mobility 
i s a cause of political conservat i sm . Furthermore, on the 
assumption that re spondent s answer the mobili ty que s tion on 
the ba si s of personal experience I have demonstrated t hat the 
t heory of class dis crimination doe s not account for t he 
incomplete political re socialization of the upwardly mobile in 
thi s country. In addition, I have offered some argument in 
justification of my assumption about the way re spondent s 
answer. 
A Further Argument 
49 
Chapter 5 
CONCLUSION 
Quite apart from the evidence presented in the last two 
chapters there i s an independent reason for doubting the va~ue 
of the theory of class discrimination. It will be recalled 
that the theory explained trans-Atlantic difference s in the 
politics of the upwardly mobile in terms of dif£ering 
discrepancie s between middle and wQrking class life s tyles . 
We are now in a position to make a similar compari son between 
Australia and the United States . 
Let us fir s t observe that class differences in life style 
are no greater in Australia than they are in America . This is 
essentially a subjective asse ssment, but at leas t one piece of 
evidence supports it. Broom and Jones, in their international 
comparison of intergenerational mobility, define circulation 
mobility a s the mobility which takes place over and above that 
caused by the expanding proportion of nonmanual jobs [1969(a)]. 
They report that circulation mobility i s higher in Australia than 
in the United States. In other words , discounting the effects 
of the s tructural demand for mobility, the occupational system 
is more open in this country than in America . Since an open 
occupational system is not conducive to the maintenance of 
pronounced class di s tinctions we might conclude that life stYle 
discrepancies between the two classes are unlikely to be 
greater here than in the United States . 
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If we accept t he propo sition that life s tyle discrepancies 
between the middle and working classe s are no greater in 
Australia than t hey are in America then t he t heory of class 
di s crimination predicts that the poli t ical re socialization of 
the upwardly mobile should be no more retarded here than it i s 
in t he State s . However, as we have alreadY seen empricallY, 
in t he United States the political re socialization of the 
upwardly mobile i s complete, while in t his country it is not. 
Thus t he prediction of t he t heory is not bo rne out and on t hi s 
ground alone the t heory becomes su spect. 
Of course it i s logically po ssi ble t hat t he mechanism of 
class discrimination i s operating in both countries and that 
the difference between the poli t ical behaviour of the upwardlY 
mobile in Australia and t he United States i s a consequence of 
s ome other factor. For example, it might be that the success 
ideology, operating as Lo preato hypo the s l sed in his explanation 
of t he alleged political overconformi ty of upwardly mobile 
Americans , count eract s t he effects of class dis crimination in 
America but not in Australia. However in thi s case it i s the 
variation in this factor and not in class di scrimination which 
accounts for t he difference, and t he the ory of class discri min-
ation becomes irrelevant. 
Whatever t he case, the failure of the theory to account 
for the difference between the Australian and American 
experience s detract s from its value as an explanation of 
international differences . 
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Class Discrimination: The Verdict 
The theory of clas s di s crimination was put forward as an 
explanation of the political difference s between the European 
and American upwardly mobile. However, even if true, it s 
explanatory power, a s we have just seen, i s strictly limited, 
for it does not account for the difference between the 
Australian and American experiences. 
But in any case there i s reason to doubt th?t the class 
discrimination mechanism operate s as hypothe si s ed at all. 
Although Lopreato claimed to have demonstrated the operation 
of thi s mechani sm , we might just a s validly claim that he did 
nothing of the sort, but rather demonstrated t he existence of 
a proce ss of general class resocialization. Certainly his 
evidence i s at best ambiguous. Furthermore, we can say more 
in Australia 
definitely that/the po stulated class discrimination mechani sm 
doe s not account for the incomplete poli tical resocialization 
of the upwardly mobile. In short, the process on which the 
theory of class discrimination depends does not operate in 
Australia and i s as yet improperly te sted in Italy. 
International Difference s : A Theo r y of Class Ideology 
The theory of class di scrimination, advanced in t he context 
of a trans-Atlantic comparison, has been shown not to account 
for the difference s between Au stralia and the United State s . 
Clearly, a satisfactory theory of the political consequences 
of upward mobility must account for both trans-Atlantic and 
trans- Pacific difference s . In thi s last section I should like, 
very sketchily, to sugge s t an explanation which accounts for 
these difference s in terms of variation in the strength of 
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working class ideology. The theory is as follows : 
(1) Left voting is one of the correlate s of working 
class membership. 
(2) If the working class is the bearer of a s trong 
clas s ideology, then the commitment to left voting 
will be deeply ingrained in those brought up in 
working class familie s . 
(3) Therefore, an upwardly mobile individual whose early 
environment was permeated by a strong working clas s 
ideology will be le ss likely to change his vote 
than one whose early environment was not so permeated. 
(4) Thus, we predict that in countries with a more 
developed working class ideology t he upwardly 
mobile will be more re s istant to changing their 
voting preference. 
Let us see how thi s new theory accounts for t he difference s 
under consideration. First, the trans- Atlantic comparison. In 
mo s t European countries the major parties of the left cater 
explicitlY for t he intere s t s of the working class and e spouse 
ideological perspective s which owe much to Marx. In America, 
on the other hand, although t he working class vote s preferentially 
for t he Democrats , t hat party cannot be as clearly identified 
with the working class . The fact t hat a more s trongly ideolo-
gical party of t he left has not emerged in the Uni t ed State s 
sugge s t s that a working class ideology i s not a s well developed 
there a s in Europe. Hence our theory predict s , in accordance 
with t he fact s , t hat t he upwardly mobile in Europe will be more 
re s i s tant to changing their vote than will the upwardly mobile 
in America. 
Next, we consider the Aus tralian-American comparison. We 
may observe, first, that owing to its origins in and continued 
association with the trade union movement, t he A.L. P. i s much 
more of a workers ' party than is the Democratic party in the 
United States. The succe s s of a specifically working class 
party in Australia sugge sts that workers here are more strongly 
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committed to working class viewpoints than are their American 
counterparts . 
This suggestion is strengthened by the observation that 
while conditions in Australia in the 19th century gave ri se to 
a collectivi s t ethos, consis tent with the development of a 
working class ideology, conditions in the United States were 
conducive to a spirit of individualism which might be expected 
to hinder the emergence of a working class ideology [Alford, 
1963: 173-174J. 
These observations support the view that a working class 
ideology is more fully developed here than in America. Thus, 
invoking the theory under di scussion, this difference accounts 
for the difference in the political behaviour of the upwardl y 
mobile in the two countrie s . 
So, unlike the theory of class di scrimination, this theory 
of class ideology accounts for both trans-Atlantic and trans-
Pacific difference s . Of course, at this stage the theory i s 
little more than speculation since t he foregoing reasoning is 
certainly not conclusive. A more adequate treatment depend s 
on the development of some sati sfactory way of measuring the 
relative s trengths of the class ideologies to which the 
upwardly mobile are subject in youth . However, it s eems to 
me that thi s theory i s potentially more likely than t he t heory 
of class di scrimination to provide a sati sfactory explanation 
of the politic s of the upwardly mo bile. 
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FOOTNOTE'S 
1. For a similar statement, plus citation of some of the 
evidenc~ see Alford [1963: 36J. 
s ee Broom and Hill [1965: 98J. 
For Aus tralian data 
2. In a forthcoming article, Ray offers yet more evidence 
of the "meaningfulness " of the manual-nonmanual dis tinction 
in the Australian context. 
3. Throughout this s tudy the level of significance used i s 
5%. Furthermore, all s tati stical te st s are two-tailed 
unles s otherwise specified. 
4. This claim i s in striking contrast with that made by 
Lipset and Zetterberg. But, because of t he di spropor-
tionate tendency of t he nonmanual immobile to prefer 
Independent s , the two are not actually contradictory. 
In principle both claims could be true s imultaneously. 
5. At thi s point a word about stati stical procedure i s 
necessary • The x2 te st, in its applicat ion to contingency 
table s , i s e ssentially a t e st of whether or not two nominal 
scale s are independent. Although it may reveal t hat a 
relationship exists , in general it doe s not reveal the 
nature of the relationship. The only exception is~tn its 
application to 2 by 2 cont ingency tables . I n this case it 
i s pos sible specifically to te st for the exis tence of a 
linear relationship. Therefore, in applying the simple 
x2 te s t to the rival claims presented in the text it is 
necessary to reduce Table 5 to a 2 by 2 table. In the case 
of the fir s t claim thi s is achieved by grouping the 
Democrats and the Independent s , in the s econd, t he 
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Independents and the Republicans . In so doing, what was 
originally a five-point ordinal s cale is reduced to a 
dichotomy, and in t he process a lot of information i s lo st. 
Clearly, a method which did not require t he grouping of 
t he categories of party preference would be preferable. 
SUch a method i s the KOlmogorov-Smirov significance te s t 
[ see Blalock, 1960: 203-206J. Using t his te s t the 
Lipset-Zetterberg claim i s supported by a X2 of .11 and 
2 the alternative claim, by a X of 4c 8. I t should be 
noted t ha t t he KOlmogorov-Smirov te s t involve s t wo degree s 
of freedom and t hu s t he value 4 ~ 8 fall s short of t he 5~ 99 
necessary for significance at t he , 05 level. However, 
according to Blalock, the te s t i s a conservative one, and 
t he probabili~ of a type I error i s somewha t less t han that 
2 indicated by t he X value of 4.8. There i s t hu s lit tle 
reason to modifY t he conclusi ons arri ved at i n t he text , 
namely that upward mobiles are si gnificantly more 
Democrat ic and not significantly more Republican than the 
middle class immo bile. 
6. This conclusion i s based on a simple chi- square te st. It 
will be noticed t ha t t he row variable of Table 7 i s 
es sentially a t hree-point ordinal s cale and it might be 
thought t hat t he Kolmogorov-Smirov te s t, di s cussed i n note 
5 above, i s more suitable t han the chi- square te s t in t his 
context. However, in t he case of a t hre e-point scale the 
method of the Kolmogorov-Smirov tes t make s no bet t er u se of 
t he dat a t han doe s t he simple chi- square procedure. 
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7. The most striking feature of Table 7 is the di sproportionate 
support which the upwardly mobile give to Independents at 
the expense of both Democrats and Republicans. This 
suggests that Independent cadidates offer the upwardly 
mobile a political 'half-way house' . Alford ' -argues that 
the D. L. P. performs thi s function for upwardly mobile 
Catholics in Australia [1963: 2l8J. 
8. Since t he political overconformity thesi s predicts not 
onlY that a difference exist s between the upwardly mobile 
and the middle class immobile, but also the direction of 
the difference, a case can be made for using a one-tailed 
rather than a two-tailed statistical testing procedure. 
SUch a procedure is more likely to reject the null 
hypothesis, that is, it is more favourable to the over-
conformity thesi s . However, it turns out that using a 
one-tailed test doe s not alter any of the conclusions 
about political overconformity reached in t he text. 
i 
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